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Abstract—This paper investigates the physical-layer security of
an amplify-and-forward wireless cooperative network where N
source nodes communicate with their corresponding destination
nodes under the help of an untrusted relay. In each slot
only one user-pair is scheduled to transmit the information,
and the destination aided cooperative jamming is adopted to
protect information from being intercepted by the untrusted
relay. Three user-pair selection schemes have been proposed for
the considered system, namely opportunistic user-pair selection
(OUS) scheme, greedy user-pair selection (GUS) scheme and
genie-aided user-pair selection (GAUS) scheme. Both the secrecy
outage probability and average secrecy rate have been studied
to evaluate the performance of the OUS and GUS schemes, and
the asymptotic analysis has also been obtained. It reveals that,
the proposed schemes can improve the secrecy performance for
the cooperative multiuser networks as the number of user-pairs
increases. We also prove that the achievable diversity order of
both OUS scheme and GUS scheme is N
2
. Finally, numerical and
simulation results are presented to validate the accuracy of the
developed analytical results.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, untrusted relay network-
s, cooperative jamming, user-pair selection, multiuser diversity,
secrecy outage probability, average secrecy rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
OWING to the broadcast nature of wireless medium, itis a challenging work to ensure the secure transmis-
sion in wireless communications, especially for the multiuser
systems [1]–[3]. Physical layer security (PLS) is becoming
increasingly recognized as a promising technique to safeguard
data transmissions by exploiting the randomness of wireless
channels [4]–[6]. Therefore, by taking the advantage of the
multiuser diversity, user selection and transmission scheduling
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for secure communications have been widely investigated
in [7]–[9]. Recently, cooperative relay has been adopted in
multiuser networks not only for the enhancement of reliability
and connectivity but also an effective physical layer method
to improve the security [10]–[14].
From the perspective of PLS, a friendly relay may protect
the confidential message from leaking. However, in public
or financial networks, the relay may not always be trusted
since the different security clearances of each node and
the different levels of access to the information [15], [16].
Therefore, it is necessary to avoid the potential overhearing of
the information signal, while utilizing the untrusted relay to
improve the reliability of wireless communications. In [17],
the achievable secrecy rate for the untrusted relay channel
with confidential information is first investigated. The secure
communication for a single untrusted multiple-input-multiple-
output (MIMO) relay network is considered in [18], where
the joint source/relay beamforming scheme has been designed
to maximize secrecy rate. In [19], the achievable secrecy rate
is presented for the three-node cooperative networks with the
consideration of the existing of the source-destination link,
and the performance of secrecy outage probability (SOP) is
studied in [20]. A novel modulo-and-forward scheme has been
proposed in [21] to achieve a full generalized secure diversity
gain. In [22], the physical-layer network coding scheme has
been proposed in the two-way relay scenario to enhance
throughput and guarantee data confidentiality.
As an effective approach among the PLS techniques, co-
operative jamming can degrade the channel quality of the
eavesdroppers for ensuring security [23], which has attract-
ed many interests in many wireless applications as well as
untrusted relay networks [18-26]. In [24], the source based
jamming scheme has been proposed to achieve a positive
secrecy rate, however, this scheme relies on the random seeds
sharing between source and destination. A friendly node can
act as a jammer to improve the security by utilizing a proper
jamming power [25], [26]. Destination itself can also con-
tribute to deteriorating the received signal at the relay, and the
intentional jamming can be subtracted from the received signal
at destination by applying the self-interference cancellation
[27]. Destination-based jamming (DBJ) promises a positive
secrecy rate without the help of external nodes, which has been
paid a lot of attention in untrusted relay networks [20-26]. DBJ
has been first proposed in [28], in which the upper bound of
secrecy rate is obtained. In [29], the optimal power allocation
between source and destination has been investigated. In [30],
DBJ and precoding schemes have been jointly considered
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in MIMO untrusted relay networks. The authors in [31]
analyze ergodic secrecy rate (ESR) for cooperative multicast
networks, in which the energy harvesting destination nodes are
considered. For multi-relay scenario, the lower bound of the
ergodic secrecy capacity for a single source-destination pair
is derived in [32]. It reveals that increasing the number of
untrusted relays cannot improve but decrease the achievable
secrecy rate. In [33], the secrecy order for both distributed
beamforming and opportunistic relaying is obtained. It shows
that, as the number of relay increases, the diversity order for
the two schemes is limited to one.
In this paper, we consider the secure communication for an
untrusted relay network with multiple source-destination pairs.
Although a lot of research has been done in multiple source-
destination pairs scenario [34], [35], there is a little work
investigating for the PLS. In [36], the authors propose an user-
pair selection scheme to achieve a better security-reliability
tradeoff. For the cooperative communications, In [14], the
authors consider a multiuser scenario consisting of one user
pair with security requirement and several unclassified user
pairs, in which the transmit power of multiple sources and
the relay beamformer are jointly designed to maximize the
achievable secrecy rate. In [37], the authors consider a relay-
aided multiple-source multiple-destination network with the
presence of multiple eavesdroppers, and propose two algo-
rithms to maximize the sum secrecy rate. The existing work on
cooperative networks with multiple source-destination nodes
mainly considers that the relay is trusted, so it can be used
to improve the security. However, if the relay is untrusted,
especially when the direct link between source and destination
does not exist due to the blockage or high attenuation, things
will become difficult. To be more specific, we cannot use the
direct links to improve the secrecy performance as in [20].
Further, it is well known that for an AF protocol, the signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) of the source-relay-destination link is always
lower than that of the source-relay link. How to enjoy the
connectivity of the cooperation as well as keeping confidential
information from being intercepted by the untrusted relay is
deserved to be further studied. Therefore, we introduce DBJ
to promise the secure communication. On the other hand, as a
low overhead and power saving method, we also introduce the
user-pair selection in our work to further improve the security
of the considered system. It should be pointed out that, the
problem of the best user-pair selection can be regarded as the
best relay selection for the single source-destination scenario
with multiple relays under the assumption that the relay nodes
are trustworthy [35]. When the relay is untrusted, although
some solid work [32], [33] reveals that relay selection cannot
improve the security, things will become different for the user-
pair selection. Hence, we focus our attention on the following
two aspects in this paper: 1) The secrecy performance of the
considered networks; 2) Whether the secrecy performance can
be improved through the multiuser diversity? Our contribution
can be summarized as follows:
 We introduce the cooperative jamming technique into
an untrusted relay network withN source-destination
pairs, and propose three user-pair selection schemes
 
i.e., 1. opportunistic user-pair selection (OUS); 2.
greedy user-pair selection (GUS); 3. genie-aided
user-pair selection (GAUS)

to improve the secrecy
performance for the considered system.
 To evaluate the performance of the proposed the OUS
scheme and the GUS scheme, both the SOP and
the average secrecy rate (ASR) have been derived
in closed-form expressions.
 Asymptotic analysis is presented, which shows that
the achievable diversity order for both OUS and GUS
is N2 . Increasing the number of N will increase the
secrecy performance owing to the multiuser diversity,
however, the diversity order for the single user-pair
with N untrusted relay scenario is limited to one.
 Some simulation results are made to help us analyze
the effectiveness of the proposed schemes and the
accuracy of the analytical results. Compared with the
round-robin user-pair selection scheme, the proposed
schemes can achieve a better performance on SOP
and ASR due to taking the advantage of multiuser
diversity.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The system
model is described in Section II. The user-pair selection
schemes are described in Section III. In Section IV, the
performance analysis for the OUS scheme is studied. The
analysis of the GUS is given in Section V. Simulation results
for the two schemes are presented in Section VI. Finally,
Section VII concludes this paper.
Notation: Throughout this paper, X  CN (a; b) denotes
that X is a complex Gaussian random variable with mean a
and variance b. [x]+ , maxf0; xg, Pr() denotes probability.
fX(), FX(), FXjY () denote the probability density func-
tion (PDF), the cumulative distribution function (CDF) and
conditional CDF of a random variable X , respectively. E[X]
denotes the expectation of a random variable X .
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a cooperative network with N legitimate
source-destination pairs and one untrusted relay1, and all of
them share the same wireless medium. Time is slotted and
each time slot is divided into two phases, only one user-pair
with the best secrecy performance is scheduled in a single time
slot. Slow fading channels are considered, where the channel
coefficient of each wireless link remains static within each
slot but varied from one slot to another. It is assumed that
the channels are reciprocal. The channel coefficient between
source i and relay is denoted by hi  CN (0; 1) and
gi  CN (0; 2) is the channel coefficient between relay and
destination i. All the nodes are equipped with a single antenna
and all of them are working in a half-duplex mode. We assume
that the direct links between sources and destinations are non-
existent, due to the long distance or high attenuation of the
signals [13], [32]. The noise at relay and destinations has
been modeled as independent additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) with zero mean and unit variance.
1We assume that the relay is trusted at the service level and untrusted at
the data level.
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Fig. 1. Two-phase multiple user-pairs cooperative network with an untrusted
relay.
For the acquisition of CSI, like the method in [32], source i
first broadcasts the request-to-send (RTS) signal to the relays.
After receiving the RTS, the relay performs channel estimation
to obtain hi. After that, clear-to-send (CTS) is transmitted from
the relay to all sources and all destinations. A pilot signal
and the value of hi are included in the CTS packet. Finally,
each destination can obtain the channel state information (CSI)
between relay and itself, and CSI of all source-relay links.
Besides, a two-step training scheme can also be adopted for
the CSI acquirement as in [38, Section II-D].
During the first phase, we assume that the user-pair Ui
is scheduled to transmit information, i 2 f1; :::; Ng. The
source broadcasts information signal xi to the relay, while
the destination sends jamming signal di (i.e., artificial noise)
to prevent the confidential information from leaking with the






Pdi + nR; (1)
where nR is the AWGN at the relay. The signal-to-
interference-and-noise-ratio (SINR) at the relay is given by
R;i =
P jhij2
P jgij2 + 1 : (2)
In the second phase, the relay forwards the received signal
to the destination with the amplifying coefficient 'i which
is given by 'i =
p
P=(P jhij2 + P jgij2 + 1). The received
signal at destination i can be expressed as





P'igigidi + 'iginR + ni;
(3)
where ni is the AWGN at the destination. The jamming
signal di is transmitted by destination i, meanwhile, both hi
and gi are known at the destination. Thus, destination i can
subtract the term
p
P'igigidi from its received signal. After
the interference cancelation, the received SNR at destination
i is given by
d;i =
P 2jhij2jgij2
P jhij2 + 2P jgij2 + 1 : (4)
III. USER-PAIR SELECTION
In this section, we propose two user-pair selection schemes
which are described as follows.
A. Opportunistic User-pair Selection
In the OUS scheme, the best user-pair which maximizes the
instantaneous secrecy rate will be selected in each slot. The






















Here, since the other destinations are trusted, the potential
overhearing of the destination nodes is not considered in our
work. We only focus on the secure communication at the
untrusted relay node, and utilize the proper selection scheme
to enhance the security for the user-pair system.












where  = 22Rth and Rth is the target secrecy rate. In the
























where i = P jhij2 and i = P jgij2.
B. Greedy User-pair Selection
The GUS scheme is to select the best source node j and




















The GUS scheme for a single transmission slot can be easily
implemented as follows:
 The destination user which has the maximum chan-
nel gain between destination and relay will be




 With the settled destination i, the source which
can achieve the maximum secrecy rate will be
selected to transmit the information, i.e., j =
2The destination node selection can be decoupled from the source node
selection due to the following observations. For any source j The term
P2jhj j2jgij2
P jhj j2+2P jgij2+1
increases as jgij2 increases, and the term P jhj j
2
P jgij2+1
decreases as jgij2 increases. Thus, the achievable secrecy rate increases as
jgij2 increases, which means that selecting the best relay-destination link will
always benefit the achievable secrecy rate.
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where j = P jhj j2 and  = max
i2f1;:::;Ng
P jgij2.
For the OUS scheme, each source node only has some
information to be transmitted to a specific destination. While,
if each source has different data to be transmitted to all
destinations (i.e., eHealth [39], social networking [40]), the
scheduled destinations are not necessarily the partners of the
scheduled sources as in OUS scheme. Therefore, we can
use the GUS scheme to achieve a better performance, which
can be also regarded as an upper bound of performance
for any other situations in considered system. Besides, the
topology and the analysis for the scheme can also fit for the
secrecy communication between a single source with multiple
antennas and multiple destinations via an untrusted relay, and
the source node selection can be regarded as the antenna
selection.

















Following the same operation in (7), the SOP of GUS scheme











C. Genie-aided User-pair Selection
For the GAUS scheme, the destination k can be selected
to help the information receiver (i.e., destination i) to send
the jamming signal in the first phase. If the jamming signal
can be subtracted by destination i in the second phase, the


















It is worth pointing out that, to ensure the jamming signal
dk can be subtracted by destination i, it is necessary to take
the additional operations (i.e., the pseudo-random code sharing
between each destination but not opening to the untrusted relay
[25], or random seeds sharing by utilizing the reciprocity of the
channels [24], [31]). Meanwhile, the CSI between relay and
destination k should also be provided to the destination i. On
the other hand, unlike the OUS scheme and the GUS scheme,
the term (11) is more complicated and hard for us to give
a further analysis. Therefore, we only present the simulation
result as a benchmark in Section VI.
In the following two sections, we will investigate the
analytical expressions of SOP, secrecy diversity order and ASR
for the OUS and GUS schemes. Here, we mainly focus on
two types of situations: Case 1. The CSI between relay and
selected destination can be fed back to the selected source;
Case 2. The CSI between relay and selected destination cannot
be fed back to the selected source. For the first case, the
source has the knowledge of both the main channel fading
coefficient and wiretap channel fading coefficients. Therefore,
the coding scheme can be adapted to every realization of the
fading coefficient. We characterize the ASR as the fundamental
security metric. For the second case, the source cannot know
the whole main channel fading coefficient, so there is no
choice but to encode the confidential information at a constant
rate. Under this circumstance, we characterize the SOP as the
fundamental security metric.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS FOR OUS SCHEME
This section provides a comprehensive performance analysis
for the OUS scheme.
A. Outage Performance












where Xi = ii , Zi =
Xii
(Xi+2)(Xi+1)
. The PDF of i and i
are fi(x) = 1e
 1x, fi(x) = 2e




. The conditional CDF FXiji can be obtain as
follows
FXiji(xjy) = 1  e 1yx: (13)


















where (a) holds when z > 0. Since the value range of  
is 1 to 1, the obtained expression can fit for any nonneg-
ative target rate Rth. Define equation: X2i + (3   yz )Xi +
2 = 0 and  = (yz   3)2   8. Then the probability
Pr
 
X2i + (3  yz )Xi + 2  0jy

can be expressed as the sum-
mation of three events, corresponding to the following cases
1) z   i  z+ (  0);
2) 0  i < z  (the equation has two negative roots);
3) z+ < i (the equation has two positive roots).






























































































+)zdy + 1  e 2+z:
(15)
Neither integration formulas nor techniques in the literature
can be utilized to solve (15) in closed-form. Fortunately,
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an approximation can be given with the help of Gaussian-
Chebyshev quadrature [41]. Then we have the following
theorem.





























































G is a complexity-accuracy tradeoff parameter.
Proof: Please see Appendix A.
Then, we will provide the following proposition.





































where 1 =  2 + 12 + (2)
2
21
, 2 = 1(3 + 21 )
2, 3 = 2p1
and  (a; x) is the incomplete gamma function defined in [42,
eq.(8.350.2)].
Proof: Please see Appendix B.
With the help of Proposition 1, we can also analyze the
diversity gain achieved by the OUS scheme. The diversi-
ty order of the secure communication is defined by d =
limP!1   logPoutlogP , then the diversity order can be obtained
as follows.
Theorem 2: The diversity order of the OUS scheme is N2 .
Proof: Please see Appendix C.
In trusted relay networks, the best relay selection for the
“N relays with a single user-pair” scenario can achieve the
same diversity order as the best user-pair selection for the
“N user-pairs with a single relay” scenario, namely both of
them can achieve a diversity order of N . When the relay is
untrusted, the diversity order of “N user-pairs with a single
relay” scenario reduces to N2 . However, the diversity order of
“N relays with a single user-pair” scenario is limited to one.
This phenomenon is mainly because of the following reasons:
1) For “N relays with a single user-pair” scenario, relay
selection can only improve the main channel capacity
(end-to-end capacity for the source-destination pair),
while making no effort to the wiretap channel ca-
pacity (maximum capacity of all untrusted relays).
For “N user-pairs with a single relay” scenario,
both main channel capacity and wiretap channel
capacity will be influenced by user-pair selection.
Selecting the proper user-pair can improve the main
channel capacity while impairing the wiretap channel
capacity, thus improving the secrecy capacity.
2) With the increasing N , more relays can be utilized
to improve the main channel capacity in “N relays
with a single user-pair” scenario. However, it will
also increase the wiretap channel capacity due to
the increased number of eavesdroppers. Therefore,
increasing the number of relay will make no con-
tribution for relay selection to improve the secrecy
order. On the other hand, in “N user-pairs with a
single relay” scenario the increased user-pairs will
provide the selection more chances to achieve a
higher user diversity gain.
B. Average secrecy rate
ASR is the maximum achievable rate averaged over all
realizations of the fading coefficients. Following [43], the ASR





































Then we can also obtain the approximation of FZi (z) as
follow




























kg (b1(g) + b2(g)











22x. By using [42,
eq.(3.381.3)], we have





























Then we will provide the lower bound of ASR for the OUS
scheme.
Proposition 2: The ASR of the OUS scheme is lower
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where 	2(x) = 
1=x





































,x =  C   ln(x), s,xn = n(1 + x),
3 =
2
2 , C is the Euler constant defined in [42, eq.(8.367.1)],




fAg = A if the condition B holds
and 
B
fAg = 0 otherwise.
Proof: Please see Appendix D.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS FOR GUS SCHEME
The analysis of the GUS scheme will be presented in this
section.
A. Outage Performance
























































With the help of Gaussian-Chebyshev quadrature [41, eq.
(25.4.42)], we can get the following theorem.
Theorem 4: The SOP of the GUS scheme can be approx-
imated as
PGUSout  (1  e 2












where ag and g have been defined before. The bound of SOP
for GUS scheme is provided as follows.


































































, nk = 2(n + 1)   1k, A(x) =
(1   e 12x)N  1  (1  e 22x)N + (1   e 22x)N and




exp( t2)dt is the complementary error
function defined in [42, eq.(8.250.4)].
Proof: Please see Appendix E.
Following the Proposition 3, the diversity order can be
obtained as follows.
Theorem 5: The diversity order of the GUS scheme is N2 .
Proof: Please see Appendix F.
It can be noticed that the achievable diversity orders for the
OUS and GUS schemes are the same. That is to say, although
more flexibility is introduced to the GUS scheme, the existing
of the untrusted relay will be the bottleneck for GUS to achieve
a better diversity performance.
B. Average secrecy rate


































p2b4(y; z)dy + 1:
(29)
Then the approximation of FbZ(z) can be also given by
FbZ(z)






















After taking some manipulations for the gotten FbZ(z), the
following theorem can be obtained.
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where (x) = (n1 n3)b2(x)++n3b2(x) +(n2+1)b1(x).
Then we will also provide the lower bound for GUS.







































where 4 = n11, 5 = (n2 + 1)2, and 6 = 4(ln(4)  
ln(5)) if 4 = 5, 6 = 4   5 otherwise.
Proof: Please see Appendix G.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section presents some numerical results to demonstrate
the performance of the proposed schemes. Without loss of
generality, the following parameters will be used throughout
this section. The target secrecy rate is set to be Rth = 1 bit per
channel use (BPCU), and 1 = 2 = 1 if there is no additional
description in the figure. The Gaussian-Chebyshev parameter
is chosen as G = 11. We use “SNR” to denote the power levels
in all figures, since the unit variance of noise is considered at
the relay node and each destination. The simulation results
of the GAUS scheme will be provided in this section. We
also present 3 benchmark schemes as the comparisons: 1.
the round-robin user-pair selection (RRUS) in the considered
networks; 2. conventional maximum transmission rate user-
pair selection without cooperative jamming (CUS) [35]; 3. the
best relay selection (BRS) in “N untrusted relays with a single
user-pair” scenario [32].
A. Outage Performance
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, show the outage performance of the OUS
and GUS schemes for N = 2 and 3. Besides, some benchmark
schemes are presented dispersedly in the two figures. The
derived approximated results agree well with the simulations,
and the lower bound of SOP also presents a good match for a
large SNR. It can be observed that, the GUS scheme achieves
almost the same secrecy performance of the GAUS scheme,
which indicates that the GUS scheme can provide the near-
optimal secrecy performance without the collaboration among
destinations. From the curve of the CUS scheme, we can
observe that conventional user-pair selection scheme without
cooperative jamming cannot ensure the secure communication
due to the overhearing of the untrusted relay. All of the
proposed schemes outperform the round-robin scheme since
their diversity gain can be improved when more users can


























CUS   N=2






Fig. 2. Secrecy outage probability vs SNR for the OUS scheme, with user-
pair number N = 2, 3.


























RRUS   N=2




Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probability vs SNR for the GUS scheme, with user-
pair number N = 2, 3.
be scheduled. It can be seen from the BRS scheme that,
increasing the number of N makes little effect on the best
relay selection scheme in “N relays with a single user-pair”
scenario, which is in agreement with our previous analysis
in Section IV. Comparing Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, it can be found
that GUS outperforms OUS at the outage performance. The
reason is that, there are N2 combinations of source-relay link
and relay-destination link for GUS to choose from, however,
there are only N combinations for OUS. Therefore, there is
more likely for the GUS scheme to achieve a lower secrecy
outage.
Fig. 4 shows the diversity order of the OUS and GUS
schemes. Since the effectiveness of the derived lower bound
and the approximation expression have already been verified
in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, we only provide theoretical curves in
this figure. The lower bounds perfectly match the derived
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Asymptotic expression in (58)
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Fig. 4. Asymptotic secrecy outage probability vs SNR for the two schemes,
with user-pair number N = 2, 3.












































 1=1,  2=0.5
 1=1,  2=0.5
1=0.5, 2=1
1=0.5, 2=1
Fig. 5. Secrecy outage probability vs SNR for the two schemes, with different
1, 2 and user-pair number N = 3.
asymptotic results in (42) and (58), which confirms that the
diversity order of the OUS scheme and the GUS scheme is
N
2 . There is another interesting observation in the figure. As
N increases, the SOP curves of the two schemes can achieve
the same slop, however, the gap between the OUS scheme and
the GUS scheme becomes larger with the increased N . That
is to say, increasing the transmission power P can achieve the
same enhancement of the secrecy outage performance for the
two schemes, while increasing the number of user-pair N will
boost the enhancement of secrecy outage performance for the
GUS scheme.


























CUS   N=2






Fig. 6. Average secrecy rate vs SNR for the OUS schemes, with user-pair
number N = 2, 5.
Fig. 5 presents the secrecy outage probability of the two
schemes with different 1, 2. It can be observed that, there
is a great performance loss for the two schemes as the decrease
in 2. This phenomenon is due to the following two reasons: 1)
With the decreasing 2, the main channel will be deteriorated
due to the deterioration of the general relay-destination link
condition. 2) The wiretap channels are not impeded by the
decreasing 2, while the impact of the jamming signal is
crippled. In contrast, for the decreased 1, there is less
performance loss or even better outage performance in the
high SNR regimes. As the 1 decreases, both the main channel
and the wiretap channel will be influenced. The performance
loss in the small SNR regimes is caused by the transmission
outage due to the poor source-relay link condition. On the
other hand, since the general condition of the relay-destination
link is better than the source-relay link, the jamming signal can
be used more effectively in the high SNR regimes.
B. Secrecy rate performance
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 present the simulated ASR, the derived
approximated results and the lower bound of ASR for the
OUS and GUS schemes. From the curve of the CUS scheme,
we can also obtain that the conventional user-pair selection
scheme without DBJ cannot achieve positive secrecy rate at
any SNR. Comparing the four user-pair selection schemes in
the considered system, we can find that, all of the proposed
schemes are better than the round-robin scheme, which shows
the effectiveness of proposed schemes for improving the ASR.
The ASR of the GUS scheme is very close to the GAUS
scheme. We can also observe that, the increasing N gives
better performance for the proposed schemes. Therefore, the
secrecy performance of the considered system can benefit
from the increased user-pairs as long as taking full advantage
of multiuser diversity. In contrast, from the curve of the
BRS scheme, we can see that the secrecy rate of the best
relay selection in “N relays with a single user-pair” scenario
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Fig. 7. Average secrecy rate vs SNR for the GUS schemes, with user-pair
number N = 2, 5.

























































Fig. 8. Average secrecy rate vs SNR for the two schemes, with different 1,
2 and user-pair number N = 5.
reduces as N increases, such observation can also be obtained
in [32]. It reveals that, exploiting the multiuser diversity,
instead of cooperative diversity, is an efficient method of
enhancing the secrecy performance for the untrusted relay
networks.
In Fig. 8, the ASR of the OUS and GUS schemes with
different 1, 2 is plotted. The present results show that
the ASR will decrease as the decrease in 1 or 2. The
decreased 2 will result in a great performance loss, since
the deterioration of relay-destination link will only worsen the
main channel condition.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate secure communication for
untrusted relay networks with multiple source-destination
pairs. Three DBJ aided user-pair selection schemes have
been proposed to prevent information from being intercepted.
Analytical expressions of both SOP and ASR have been
derived for the OUS and GUS schemes in closed-forms. Some
theoretic and simulation results have been also presented. It
can be obtained that, the proposed schemes outperform the
round-robin scheme, which shows the effectiveness of using
multiuser diversity gain in the considered networks. The GUS
scheme outperforms the OUS scheme due to the additional
flexibility provided by the source cooperation, whereas, the
OUS scheme can achieve the same diversity order (namely
N
2 ) as GUS scheme. We can also conclude that, although
increasing the number of relays (cooperative diversity) cannot
benefit the considered untrusted relay networks, the secrecy
performance can be improved by increasing the number of
user-pairs (multiuser diversity).
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1






, the term (15)

















Then, with the help of Gaussian-Chebyshev quadrature [41,















































Due to the independent and identical distribution of each
channel, we can obtain that
FZi (z) =

1  e 2+z + F1(z)
N
; (35)
where i = arg max
i2f1;:::;Ng
Zi. POUSout = FZi ( ). It completes
the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Based on (7), following the fact that 12 min(x; y)  xyx+y 
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and it is straightforward to obtain the POUSUB by substituting
 in (39) for 4 . It completes the proof.
APPENDIX C





n! , with the aid of [42, eq.(8.352.7)] and










4 = e 2(1+2) 
= 1  2 ( 11 + 12 ) 1P +O( 1P 2 );
(40)
and





















































As same as the above operation, we can easily verify that
the diversity order for upper bound case is also equal to N2 .
Hence, it can be concluded that the diversity order of OUS
scheme is equal to N2 . It completes the proof.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
From the expression of ASR in (18), we have
























= 12 ln 2
h
E fln (k)g+ 2E fln (k)g




where k = arg max
i2f1;:::;Ng
(i; i). To obtain the expectations,









 1x   nse (n+1)sx ;
(44)
where s = 1+2. Due to the symmetry, we can also obtain
the PDF of k from (44). With the derived fk(x) and fk(x),
















































































With the help of [42, eq.(4.331.1)] and [42, eq.(4.352.2)], we
can obtain (22). It completes the proof.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Similar to the expressions (36) and (37), we can also obtain

































0018-9545 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TVT.2018.2882178, IEEE
Transactions on Vehicular Technology
11
We rewrite (46) as
PGUSLB =Z 1
2 

































(1  e 12 )N ke 1( y
2
  y)kf(y)dy| {z }
J1
+(1  e 22 )N :
(48)
























+(1  e 12 )N (1  (1  e 22 )N ):
(49)
With the aid of [42, eq.(3.322.1)], we have
J2 =
q
















Combining (48), (49) and (50), the lower bound PGUSLB is
acquired. After variable substitution, the upper bound PGUSUB
can also be obtained. It completes the proof.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
First, it can be obtained that
A( ) = (1  e 12 )N   (1  e 12 )N (1  e 22 )N
+(1  e 22 )N





N ( 2 2
1
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= I1 + I2 + I3;
(52)































































( 12   N1 )2m q( n2 )q;
(54)
where erf(x) , 1   erfc(x) is the error function defined in
[42, eq.(8.250.1)].








( 1)nnq = 0; (55)







( 1)nnN 1 = ( 1)N 1(N   1)!: (56)
Following (53), in I2 all the terms with nq for q  N   2 can
be removed. At high SNR, when N is odd, all the factors with
( 1P )
m+ 12 for m > N 12 can be ignored, the dominant factor




2 . When N is even,






























































Therefore, all the terms with nq for q  N   2 can be
removed from I3, where q = q + 2k + 1. Then, the dominant






2 when N is odd, and the






2 when N is even.

























($2 k)!k!(2k+1) , $2 =
N 2
2 . It can be easily obtained that
the upper bound of outage probability is at the order of N2 .
Thus, the diversity order of GUS scheme is equal to N2 . It
completes the proof.
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APPENDIX G
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
From the expression of ASR in (28), we have






ln( ii+2 )  ln(1 + i )
+

24E maxi2f1;:::;Ng ln( ii+2 )  maxj2f1;:::;Ng ln(1+j )
2 ln 2
35+




ln( +2 )  ln(1 +  )
oi+
= 12 ln 2 [E fln ()g+ E fln ()g
 E fln(+ 2)g   E ln(1 +  )	+ ;
(59)
where  = max
i2f1;:::;Ng
i. To obtain the expectation in (59),
the PDF of the related random variables are also required.
The PDF of  is given in (24), and it is easy to obtain f


























































By using [42, eq.(4.331.1)], [42, eq.(4.352.2)] and [42, e-
q.(4.291.15)], we can derive the four expectations respectively.
After some reorganizations, we can get (32). It completes the
proof.
REFERENCES
[1] T. X. Zheng, H. M. Wang, J. Yuan, Z. Han and M. H. Lee, “Physical
layer security in wireless ad hoc networks under a hybrid full-/half-duplex
receiver deployment strategy,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 16,
no. 6, pp. 3827-3839, Jun. 2017.
[2] A. Mukherjee, S. A. A. Fakoorian, J. Huang and A. L. Swindlehurst,
“Principles of physical layer security in multiuser wireless networks: a
survey,” IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutor., vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 1550-1573, Aug.
2014.
[3] L. Lv, Z. Ding, Q. Ni and J. Chen, “Secure MISO-NOMA transmission
with artificial noise,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 67, no. 7, pp. 6700-
6705, Jul. 2018.
[4] G. Pan, C. Tang, X. Zhang, T. Li, Y. Weng and Y. Chen, “Physical-
layer security over non-small-scale fading channels,” IEEE Trans. Veh.
Technol., vol. 65, no. 3, pp. 1326-1339, Mar. 2016.
[5] L. Yang, J. Chen, H. Jiang, S. A. Vorobyov and H. Zhang, “Optimal
relay selection for secure cooperative communications with an adaptive
eavesdropper,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 26-42,
Jan. 2017.
[6] L. Yang, H. Jiang, S. A. Vorobyov, J. Chen and H. Zhang, “Secure
communications in underlay cognitive radio networks: user scheduling
and performance analysis,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 20, no. 6, pp. 1191-
1194, Jun. 2016.
[7] Y. Zou, X. Wang and W. Shen, “Physical-layer security with multiuser
scheduling in cognitive radio networks,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 61,
no. 12, pp. 5103-5113, Dec. 2013.
[8] H. Deng, H. M. Wang, J. Yuan, W. Wang and Q. Yin, “Secure communi-
cation in uplink transmissions: user selection and multiuser secrecy gain,”
IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 64, no. 8, pp. 3492-3506, Aug. 2016.
[9] X. Ge, H. Jin, J. Zhu, J. Cheng and V. C. M. Leung, “Exploiting
opportunistic scheduling in uplink wiretap networks,” IEEE Trans. Veh.
Technol., vol. 66, no. 6, pp. 4886-4897, Jun. 2017.
[10] L. Fan, N. Yang, T. Q. Duong, M. Elkashlan and G. K. Karagiannidis,
“Exploiting direct links for physical layer security in multiuser multirelay
networks,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 15, no. 6, pp. 3856-3867,
Jun. 2016.
[11] T. M. Hoang, T. Q. Duong, H. A. Suraweera, C. Tellambura and H.
V. Poor, “Cooperative beamforming and user selection for improving the
security of relay-aided systems,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 63, no. 12,
pp. 5039-5051, Dec. 2015.
[12] H. Deng, H. Wang, W. Guo and W. Wang, “Secrecy transmission with
a helper: To relay or to jam,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol.
10, no. 2, pp. 293-307, Feb. 2015.
[13] S. I. Kim, I. M. Kim and J. Heo,“Secure transmission for multiuser relay
networks,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 14, no. 7, pp. 3724-3737,
Jul. 2015.
[14] C. Wang, H. M. Wang, D. W. K. Ng, X. G. Xia and C. Liu, “Joint
beamforming and power allocation for secrecy in peer-to-peer relay
networks,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 14, no. 6, pp. 3280-3293,
Jun. 2015.
[15] J. Mo, M. Tao, Y. Liu and R. Wang, “Secure beamforming for MIMO
two-way communications with an untrusted relay,” IEEE Trans. Signal
Process., vol. 62, no. 9, pp. 2185-2199, May 2014.
[16] L. Lv, Q. Ni, Z. Ding and J. Chen, “Cooperative non-orthogonal relaying
for security enhancement in untrusted relay networks,” in Proc. 2017
IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), Paris, France,
May 2017, pp. 1-6.
[17] Y. Oohama, “Coding for relay channels with confidential messages,” in
Proc. Inf. Theory Workshop (ITW), Cairns, QLD, Australia, Sep. 2001,
pp. 87-89.
[18] C. Jeong, I.-M. Kim, and D. I. Kim, “Joint secure beamforming design
at the source and the relay for an amplify-and-forward MIMO untrusted
relay system” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 60, no. 1, pp. 310-325,
Jan. 2012.
[19] X. He and A. Yener, “Cooperation with an untrusted relay: A secrecy
perspective,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 56, no. 8, pp. 3807-3827, Aug.
2010.
[20] J. Huang, A. Mukherjee, and A. Swindlehurst, “Secure communication
via an untrusted non-regenerative relay in fading channels,” IEEE Trans.
Signal Process., vol. 61, no. 10, pp. 2536-2550, May 2013.
[21] S. Zhang, L. Fan, M. Peng and H. V. Poor, “Near-optimal modulo-and-
forward scheme for the untrusted relay channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory,
vol. 62, no. 5, pp. 2545-2556, May 2016.
[22] D. A. Karpuk and A. Chorti, “Perfect secrecy in physical-layer network
coding systems from structured interference,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics
Security, vol. 11, no. 8, pp. 1875-1887, Aug. 2016.
[23] Y. Huo, Y. Tian, L. Ma, X. Cheng and T. Jing, “Jamming strategies for
physical layer decurity,” IEEE Wireless Commun., vol. PP, no. 99, pp.
1-6.
[24] L. Lv, J. Chen, L. Yang and Y. Kuo, “Improving physical layer security
in untrusted relay networks: cooperative jamming and power allocation,”
IET Commun., vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 393-399, Feb. 2017.
[25] R. Zhang, L. Song, Z. Han and B. Jiao, “Physical layer security for
two-way untrusted relaying with friendly jammers,” IEEE Trans. Veh.
Technol., vol. 61, no. 8, pp. 3693-3704, Oct. 2012.
[26] A. El Shafie, A. Mabrouk, K. Tourki, N. Al-Dhahir and R. Hamila,
“Securing untrusted RF-EH relay networks using cooperative jamming
signals,” IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 24353-24367, Nov. 2017.
[27] A. Kuhestani, A. Mohammadi and M. Mohammadi, “Joint relay selec-
tion and power allocation in large-scale MIMO systems with untrusted
relays and passive eavesdroppers,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security,
vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 341-355, Feb. 2018.
[28] X. He and A. Yener, “Two-hop secure communication using an untrusted
relay: A case for cooperative jamming,” in Proc. IEEE Global Telecom-
munications Conference (Globecom), New Orleans, LA, Dec. 2008, pp.
1-5.
[29] L. Wang, M. Elkashlan, J. Huang, N. H. Tran, and T. Q. Duong, “Secure
transmission with optimal power allocation in untrusted relay networks,”
IEEE Wireless Commun. Lett., vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 289-292, Jun. 2014.
[30] J. Xiong, L. Cheng, D. Ma and J. Wei, “Destination-aided cooperative
jamming for dual-hop amplify-and-forward MIMO untrusted relay sys-
tems,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 65, no. 9, pp. 7274-7284, Sep.
2016.
[31] B. He, J. Chen, Y. Kuo and L. Yang, “Cooperative jamming for energy
harvesting multicast networks with an untrusted relay,” IET Commun.,
vol. 11, no. 13, pp. 2058-2065, Oct. 2017.
0018-9545 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TVT.2018.2882178, IEEE
Transactions on Vehicular Technology
13
[32] L. Sun, T. Zhang, Y. Li and H. Niu, “Performance study of two-
hop amplify-and-forward systems with untrustworthy relay nodes,” IEEE
Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 61, no. 8, pp. 3801-3807, Oct. 2012.
[33] J. B. Kim, J. Lim and J. M. Cioffi, “Capacity scaling and diversity order
for secure cooperative relaying with untrustworthy relays,” IEEE Trans.
Wireless Commun., vol. 14, no. 7, pp. 3866-3876, Jul. 2015.
[34] Q. Cao, Y. Jing and H. V. Zhao, “Power allocation in multi-user wireless
relay networks through bargaining,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol.
12, no. 6, pp. 2870-2882, Jun. 2013.
[35] Z. Ding and H. V. Poor, “Multi-user SWIPT cooperative networks:
Is the max-min criterion still diversity-optimal?,” IEEE Trans. Wireless
Commun., vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 553-567, Jan. 2016.
[36] X. Ding, T. Song, Y. Zou and X. Chen, “Security-reliability tradeoff
for friendly jammer assisted user-pair selection in the face of multiple
eavesdroppers,” IEEE Access, vol. 4, pp. 8386-8393, Sep. 2016.
[37] M. Zhang, M. Ding, L. Gui, H. Luo and M. Bennis,“Sum secrecy
rate maximization for relay-aided multiple-source multiple-destination
networks,” IEEE Trans. Veh Technol., vol. 66, no. 5, pp. 4098-4109, May
2017.
[38] S. Atapattu, Y. Jing, H. Jiang and C. Tellambura, “Relay selection
schemes and performance analysis approximations for two-way network-
s,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 61, no. 3, pp. 987-998, Mar. 2013.
[39] Q. Li, H. Li, P. Russell, Z. Chen and C. Wang, “CA-P2P: context-aware
proximity-based peer-to-peer wireless communications,” IEEE Commun.
Mag., vol. 52, no. 6, pp. 32-41, Jun. 2014.
[40] C. Xu, S. Jia, L. Zhong and G. M. Muntean, “Socially aware mobile
peer-to-peer communications for community multimedia streaming ser-
vices,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 53, no. 10, pp. 150-156, Oct. 2015.
[41] M. Abramowitz and I. Stegun, Handbook of Mathematical Functions
with Formulas, Graphs, and Mathematical Tables. New York, NY, USA:
Dover, 1972.
[42] A. Jeffrey and D. Zwillinger, Table of Integrals, Series, and Products.
New York, NY, USA: Academic, 2007.
[43] M. Bloch, J. Barros, M. R. D. Rodrigues and S. W. McLaughlin,
“Wireless information-theoretic security,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol.
54, no. 6, pp. 2515-2534, Jun. 2008.
[44] D. S. Michalopoulos, H. A. Suraweera, G. K. Karagiannidis and R.
Schober, “Amplify-and-forward relay selection with outdated channel
estimates,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 60, no. 5, pp. 1278-1290, May
2012.
Bingtao He received the B.Sc. and M.Sc. degrees
from Xidian University, Xi’an, China, in 2013 and
2016 respectively, and is currently pursuing the
Ph.D. degree in telecommunications engineering
with Xidian University. Since 2017, he has been
with Lancaster University, U.K., as a joint Ph.D.
student sponsored by the China Scholarship Council.
His current research interests include cooperative
communications, physical layer security and wire-
less multicast.
Qiang Ni (M’04-SM’08) received the B.Sc., M.Sc.,
and Ph.D. degrees from the Huazhong University of
Science and Technology, China, all in engineering.
He is currently a Professor and the Head of the
Communication Systems Group, School of Com-
puting and Communications, Lancaster University,
Lancaster, U.K. His research interests include the
area of future generation communications and net-
working, including green communications and net-
working, millimeter-wave wireless communication-
s, cognitive radio network systems, non-orthogonal
multiple access (NOMA), heterogeneous networks, 5G and 6G, SDN, cloud
networks, energy harvesting, wireless information and power transfer, IoTs,
cyber physical systems, machine learning, big data analytics, and vehicular
networks. He has authored or co-authored over 200 papers in these areas. He
was an IEEE 802.11 Wireless Standard Working Group Voting Member and
a contributor to the IEEE Wireless Standards.
Jian Chen received the B.S. from Xi’an Jiaotong
University, China, in 1989, the M.S. degree from
Xi’an Institute of Optics and Precision Mechanics
of Chinese Academy of Sciences in 1992, and the
Ph.D. in Telecommunications Engineering in Xidian
University, China, in 2005. He is a professor in
the school of Telecommunications Engineering in
Xidian University. He was a visitor scholar in the
University of Manchester from 2007 to 2008. His
research interests include cognitive radio, OFDM
and wireless sensor networks.
Long Yang (M’18) received the B.Sc. and Ph.D. de-
grees from Xidian University, Xi’an, China, in 2010
and 2015, respectively. Since December 2015, he
has been a faculty member with Xidian University,
Xi’an, China, where he is currently an Lecturer at the
School of Telecommunications Engineering. Since
November 2017, he has also been a Post-Doctoral
Fellow with the Department of Electrical and Com-
puter Engineering, University of Alberta, Edmonton,
Alberta, Canada. His current research interests in-
clude cooperative communications, non-orthogonal
multiple access (NOMA), wireless multicast, and wireless physical-layer
security.
Lu Lv received his Ph.D degree in Communication
and Information Systems from Xidian University,
China, in 2018. In 2016, he was a visiting Ph.D.
student at the School of Computing and Commu-
nications, Lancaster University, U.K. From 2016
to 2018, he was a visiting Ph.D student at the
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering,
University of Alberta, Canada. He is currently a
research fellow at the School of Telecommunications
Engineering, Xidian University, China. His research
interests include cooperative communications, non-
orthogonal multiple access, and physical layer security.
